Delayering and the flattening of organizational hierarchies was a widespread trend through the 1990s. Peters (1992) in the USA promoted flattening as an organizational strategy and Keuning and Opheij (1994) promoted the prescriptions in Europe. Despite these strategies and apparent structural changes, the number and ratio of managers appears to have grown. This paradox of managerial downsizing has not been adequately probed in the literature. The predominant explanation, that there has been a 'myth of managerial downsizing', is associated with Gordon (1996) . However, this debate has been shaped by the US experience and data. There is a need to reassess the dynamics of the 1990s in relation to other economies. This article focuses on a semi-peripheral economy, that of Australia. A study of the population of firms over time is necessary in order to resolve the issues. The article utilizes a comprehensive range of data, including several national surveys and a longitudinal database of all larger private-sector firms in Australia during the 1990s. The results indicate that the 'myth of managerial downsizing' must be rejected. There were dramatic effects on managers through the course of the 1990s in larger Australian firms. The dynamics of the process are analysed, tracking 4,153 firms across the decade and the paradox explained. The theoretical implications are discussed.
Introduction
At the beginning of the 1990s there was a widespread view that as organizations continued to restructure, middle managers would face numerous challenges. Management gurus and consultants promoted flattening the hierarchy. Fewer management layers would mean a concomitant dismantling of entrenched bureaucracies and traditional career structures (Peters 1992; Keuning and Opheij 1994; Skagan 1992) . This re-engineering would generate a series of organizational efficiencies, including enhanced efficiency of information processing, coordination, capital budgeting, and resource allocation (Chou 2001) . Organizational communication would be increasingly horizontal -across functions. For many, this spelt the end of middle managers, the shrinking of management numbers, and increasing spans of control. As early as 1990, Business Week saw delayering, the firing of managers, and 'white-collar blues' as hitting major European firms (Melcher 1990: 70-71) .
The 1990s also developed a contrasting literature represented most forcefully by Gordon (1996) . US corporations were growing 'fat and mean', bloated by excess executives, and contrary to media accounts, the administrative component of firms had actually grown during downsizing (Gordon 1996: 33-60 ). This conclusion is underlain by the earlier work of Freeman and Hannan (1975) , Ford (1980) , and more recently McKinley (1987 McKinley ( , 1992 McKinley ( , 1993 . What is the truth of the 1990s organizational experience and how can the paradox of managerial downsizing be resolved?
Two limitations of the existing debate require noting. First, much of the debate has been shaped by the US experience and data. There is a need to probe the situation in other economies. Second, part of the problem is that the data sources utilized have oscillated between national statistics and case studies. The use of comprehensive data sets at the level of the firm have been notable by their absence. In this article, we have focused on a longitudinal investigation of the behaviour of large firms in Australia over the decade of the 1990s. In general, we wish to focus on two key research questions.
1 Is the so-called 'myth of managerial downsizing' a valid description of trends outside the USA? What happened to employment trends and managerial labour markets during the 1990s? 2 What are the dynamics of downsizing in relation to managers?
These questions are important in understanding the changing nature of management, the shape of managerial labour markets, and managerial career structures (Jacoby 1999) . In the next two sections, the managerial downsizing literature is discussed.
Managerial Downsizing
The published literature on managerial downsizing tends to fall into three categories. Most extensive is the literature that examines the apparently changing fortunes of middle management and which notes the impact of delayering en passant. Here we may include the voluminous material in business magazines and academic studies and surveys such as those by Stewart (1990, 1993) , Dopson et al. (1992) , and Inkson and Coe (1993) . Second most common is literature which focuses on downsizing and discovers that the downsizing package involves delayering and managerial downsizing (for example, Worrall et al. 2000) . Lastly, and least common, are the references that isolate the specific phenomenon of delayering. These include McCune et al. (1988) , Wheatley (1992) , Bahrami (1992) , Shaw and Schneier (1993) , Keuning and Opheij (1994) , Ebadan and Winstanley (1997) , Thornhill et al. (1997) , and Thomas and Dunkerley (1999) .
Equally, comprehensive statistical data on managerial downsizing are limited. Nevertheless, in the conditions of rapid change in the 1990s, there was some evidence of the widespread impact of managerial downsizing.
For example, a 1992 British Institute of Management survey based on the responses of more than 1,000 middle managers and 150 employers concluded that the evidence for managerial downsizing was 'overwhelming', with 68 percent of organizations reporting a delayering or restructuring exercise in the previous five years (Wheatley 1992: 15) . The UK Quality of Working Life Surveys have provided us with a snapshot of delayering in Britain at the end of the 1990s. The repeated surveys conducted through Institute of Management members showed levels of delayering running at more than 30 percent per annum (Worrall et al. 2000; Worrall and Cooper 2001) .
On the face of it, widespread change appears to be affecting managers. Certainly, the proponents of delayering expected dramatic changes. For example, Keuning and Opheij (1994: 12, Figure 1 .3) anticipated a 50 percent reduction in management numbers in large financial corporations, while Peters (1992: 758) asserted that 'middle managers, as we have known them, are cooked geese'. In an influential study, Quinn also argued for the destruction of hierarchies and asserted that 'there is no inherent reason that organizations cannot be made infinitely flat ' (1992: 115) .
In contrast to the managerial downsizing evidence and prescriptions, Gordon (1996: 1) has emphasized the problem of reconciling aggregate US data on the growth in managerial jobs with media accounts of middle manager dissection. As he puts it, there is a 'myth of managerial downsizing'. In his widely cited study, Gordon sets out to explode 'the widespread myth that in the 1990s, after a decade of downsizing, U.S. corporations have pared their bureaucracies and are now slim and trim -free of fat and waste ' (1996: 34) . Instead, he argues that US corporations have a 'bureaucratic burden' of unnecessary supervisory and managerial staff 'which has been growing, not contracting, through the mid-1990s'. This bureaucratic burden is so large that 'It roughly equalled the national population of Australia' (Gordon 1996: 35) .
The empirical evidence of delayering reveals that the proportion of managers and administrators to non-managerial employees in the Australian and American workforces actually increased through the 1980s. This assertion can be examined using the aggregate proportion of managers and administrators in the Australian non-farm labour force based on census data. This indicated that the proportion of managers and administrators had increased from 5.4 percent in 1981 to 6.8 percent in 1991 (Littler et al. 1994: 19) .
American data tell a similar story, with the number of managers in the public and private sectors growing by 38 percent (from 10.8 to 14.8 million) between 1983 and 1989, twice the rate of growth of the workforce as a whole (Levinson 1990: 238) . As a result, the number of employees relative to the number of managers fell from 8.4 to 6.9. By industry sector, wholesale trade was the only area to record a decrease in the proportion of managers in the 1980s (Levinson 1990: 239) . Spans of control, therefore, appear to have decreased, not increased. Moving forward across the decade, a 1998 study by the US Department of Labor challenges the idea that corporate downsizing has drastically reduced middle-level managers. While downsizing has been widespread, hiring has outpaced layoffs. Some 37 percent of all the jobs created since 1989 have been for business professionals and managers. That was up from 20 percent of new jobs in the 1970s. The report states that of the 69 million new jobs created from 1959 through to 1995 (the last year in the study), 34 million jobs fell into the new business professional and manager class (US Department of Labor 1998).
For Gordon, the growth in managerial and supervisory jobs is a result of corporate greed, empire building, and control strategies associated with antagonistic labour-management relations. However, this is only one perspective. Levinson (1990) is one of the few authors who critically considers explanations for the growth of management numbers in the USA and parades a number of theories. Sectoral shifts could be one explanation. However, the growth of public-sector employment in the USA in the 1980s cannot be a comprehensive explanation. The bulk of the increase in management jobs came from the private sector, with particularly sharp increases in sectors entirely independent of government, such as marketing, property, and real estate, where the number of managers increased by between one-third and one-half. Job-title inflation is another potential explanation, but according to Levinson, this argument is undermined by the fact that managerial wages grew at a slightly faster rate than those for non-managerial employees, and the average educational attainment of managers also increased, suggesting that the position of 'manager' has not been subject to deskilling or extensive relabelling. However, the greater use of task forces and project teams may still give some credence to the job-title explanation.
A further possible explanation is that in smaller companies restructuring and outsourcing generates new management opportunities associated with the development of added managerial infrastructure, but this view conflicts with the supposed competitive advantages of outsourcing.
1 Overall, Levinson (1990: 240) concludes that the most likely cause has been the growth of complexity accompanying the growth of inputs going into the average production process. Complexity of operation means that managerial staff are still required in large numbers to plan and administer (Littler et al. 1994) . However, Levinson cannot find definitive evidence for this conclusion, nor is it clear that 'complexity' will pertain across all sectors.
Overall then, Levinson advances four key explanations for the apparent growth in US managerial numbers:
¼ Public-sector growth relative to the private sector (for which there is inadequate evidence) ¼ Job-title inflation (for which there is limited evidence) ¼ Restructuring and outsourcing processes (for which there is no evidence), and ¼ The increasing complexity of organizations (for which the evidence is unclear).
Thus, the paradox of managerial downsizing remains. Discussion at the end of the decade continued to reflect puzzlement about trends. Jacoby (1999: 123-124) , for example, recognizes the attacks on middle managers in the USA, but argues that 'career-type employment practices remain prevalent in the United States'. To our knowledge, all the recent research on the subject has been cross-sectional or at the aggregate level. There is none that examines the processes longitudinally. Clearly, we can obtain further insight into the paradox of managerial downsizing by tracking it across time using a comprehensive field of firms. In the next section, we consider the four interpretations of the 'myth of managerial downsizing' as a basis for further investigation.
Four Interpretations of the Paradox
Given the existing evidence and the preceding discussion, we wish to advance some key propositions concerning managerial downsizing reflecting the paradoxes of change. The myth of managerial downsizing suggests that various mechanisms are taking place. According to such a view, managers are being insulated within organizations as they restructure -they are not at risk and have not been at risk through the 1990s. Therefore, the numbers in a population of firms should stay relatively stable. The mechanisms of this process were put forward in a classic article by Freeman and Hannan (1975) . From the perspective of the 1970s, these authors argued that 'The very large empirical literature on the relationship of size and administrative intensity is almost wholly cross-sectional. As a result this research tradition has depended heavily on the assumption that the relations are symmetric in growth and decline' (Freeman and Hannan 1975: 227) . Freeman and Hannan conclude from a study of school districts over time that the phases of change in growth and contraction are different. They advance a 'featherbedding hypothesis' that the administrative 'component tends to increase on the upswings but decreases less on the downswings' (Freeman and Hannan 1975: 227) because cutbacks in the administrative component are 'more costly in the short-run for decision-makers than over-staffing' (Freeman and Hannan 1975: 217) . The work of Ford (1980) replicated Freeman and Hannan and reached similar conclusions.
More recently, McKinley (1987 McKinley ( , 1992 McKinley ( , 1993 has extensively pursued the issue of organizational decline and administrative intensity. In his 1987 study of manufacturing firms, McKinley argues that the greater the organizational tendency towards decline, the less positive the relationship between technical and structural complexity and administrative intensity, and that 'decline may be a force for weakening linkages between internal context and structure ' (1987: 87) . Studying the Israeli electronics industry, Rosenblatt and Mannheim (1996) found a weak tendency towards greater administrative intensity during downsizing and decline.
Virtually all of the earlier literature focused on organizational decline, and the 1990s downsizing literature recognized the proactive nature of downsizing, such that the link between downsizing and decline was modified (Cameron et al. 1993; Littler et al. 1994) . Nevertheless, the earlier research suggests a constant process of 'featherbedding' managers within downsizing organizations and this conclusion underlies Gordon's work (1996: 48) .
However, the featherbedding hypothesis is not quite as simple as it appears. There are levels of insulation of managers, or indeed any occupational group.
We consider the key distinctions below. For ease of reference through the article, the four different interpretations of the 'myth of managerial downsizing' are provided with labels.
1 The 'pseudo-downsizing' interpretation. At one extreme, there is the view that there was no significant organizational restructuring during the 1990s -managerial numbers, roles, and spans of control remained the same. Much of what took place was rhetorical, changes of labels on the public face of the corporation. For example, Jacoby (1999: 132) notes that 'the number of workers actually laid off is often much lower than the job elimination plans reported in the news releases. Companies announce the highest cutback totals they can justify to impress investors that they are getting lean and mean, and then they pursue cuts through mechanisms other than layoff ... a portion of the announced layoff never actually occurs. ' Lurie (1998) . During delayering the managers get squeezed out at the sides, to be slotted into new specialist departments which are set up in a reconfigured organization. Such a strategy permits delayering without any associated downsizing. 4 The managerial downsizing hypothesis. This 'interpretation' is a rejection of Gordon's thesis. Contra Gordon, there is the view that administrative layers are removed from the organization, resulting in managerial downsizing, a reduction in numbers, and larger spans of control. Levels of job insecurity are high. Mid-level managers may even be an 'endangered species' (Holbeche 1998: 125) .
These four interpretations of the 'myth of managerial downsizing' constitute the spread of the existing literature and are assessed in the data that follows utilizing a set of empirical probes stretching across a decade in one economy. The methods associated with the research programme are discussed in the next section. It is appropriate to note here that the structure of the article is not a conventional research paper format. In order to probe the key issue, a range of data sources (cross-sectional, longitudinal tracking of individual firms) are necessary. Consequently, the article utilizes this variety of data to build a case as it proceeds.
Method

Range of Data
The article draws on a range of Australian data sets. This multi-methodology enables us to probe the issue in depth and from a variety of perspectives. The Australian Organisation Restructuring Project has involved a series of national surveys, case studies, surveys within organizations, and the compilation of a comprehensive longitudinal data set of larger Australian firms for every year 1990-99. It is not possible in a short article to provide full details of the range of methods utilized. We will outline briefly some of the details of the longitudinal data sets and the national surveys. The interested reader can consult other publications for further details.
Australian Longitudinal Data Set (ALDS)
In the USA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission collects workforce data from private employers annually and numerates employees by occupational category, gender, and race. The parallel agency with similar statutory functions in Australia was the Affirmative Action Agency (AAA). Each year the AAA was responsible for the distribution and collation of reports to all Australian private-sector organizations with more than 100 employees. These reports provide details of organizations' total workforce by occupation, gender, and employment status (part-time, full-time, and temporary). Note that the primary reporting level of the AAA was the organization, not the establishment or workplace.
Overall, the data set consists of 4,153 company profiles with 921 profiles for the full 10 years, 1,051 firms reporting for nine years, and so on. Thus, with a few exceptions, the public sector is excluded from this database. The average size of organizations ranges between 634 and 832 employees over the years 1990-99. Over the decade this constituted between 1.4 and 1.9 million employees. Because of size, the industry composition reflects a bias towards manufacturing organizations, which made up about 37 percent of the sample in 1999. The industry group primarily consisting of the wholesale and retail trade and the industry group consisting of communications, finance and investment, insurance, and business services each represent about 20 percent of the sample.
In each year, more than 2,000 firms are measured, with 94.8 percent compliance in 1994 and 96.7 percent in 1995. These response rates constitute a comprehensive coverage. In addition, we checked back with employers and other databases to clarify some data. It took approximately three years to develop a systematic and 'clean' data set. The result is a combined longitudinal sample of 4,153 new, discontinuing, and continuing organizations from 1990 to 1999. A key attribute of this data set is that we can track the occupational profile of individual corporations across the decade. 6 years (5 sequences), and ('featherbedding') and rising 3 years (8 sequences).
administrative intensity.
Sample Design
Some of the analyses involve an examination of the total population of organizations in ALDS, while other analyses focus on organizations that are continuous downsizers from year to year. In particular, we took two types of longitudinal samples: the first comprises three-phase downsizers and the second analysed firms that continuously downsized over six years. Each of these two longitudinal sample designs were used to generate downsizing samples for analysis in each of the years from 1990 to 1997. Variables and samples are presented in Table 1 . Our analysis shows that there were no significant industry differences across the decade. In other words, new firms pursuing a downsizing strategy were distributed across the industry spectrum.
Operationalization
There is no theoretically agreed way to define 'downsizing'. Operationally, it has been used to mean planned workforce reduction. Some researchers have placed no minimum levels on the workforce reduction. The problem with such lack of specification is that a firm faced with sustained skill shortages may register as 'downsized'. Other researchers have specified numerical boundaries. For example, Cascio (1998: 59) 'arbitrarily chose 3% as the minimum level to be considered as significant downsizing'. More common has been a cut off of 5 percent (McKinley et al. 1998; Cascio et al. 1997; Morris et al. 1999; Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001) . In this article, we have used 5 percent as the key numerical cut off: changes of this magnitude are less likely to be due to attrition. All firms in the Australian Longitudinal Data Set were classified as 'downsizers', 'stables', or 'upsizers'. Therefore, the cut-offs for up, stable, and down are >5 percent, 5 percent to -5 percent, and <5 percent of workforce numbers, respectively. We developed a measure of managerial downsizing as indicated by a greater than 20 percent reduction in the number of managers in any organization. We included a check that the number of managers used for this definition must be a minimum of eight prior to any reductions. This measure is deliberately a conservative one that was utilized because change in an occupational category can be more easily confused with normal processes of labour turnover. The problem here is of developing a measure that captures both changes in medium-sized or smaller firms and changes in larger firms. The measure utilized is sensitive to change in medium-sized firms, but may understate changes in larger organizations. Nevertheless, it has proved to be a robust measure, and has been validated by cross-checking with a proportion of the survey results. It also has the advantage of being a non-intrusive measure. It should be noted that this form of 'downsizing' can take place despite organizations showing overall growth or stability in employee numbers (cf. AMA 1995 (cf. AMA , 2000 .
National Survey Methodology
A questionnaire was developed to measure downsizing and delayering in organizations. The questionnaire was standardized and applied in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in 1995-96. The research team used an expanded version of this questionnaire in the 1998 Australian survey. This had the added advantage of allowing detailed comparisons with the 1995 survey results. We only report on the Australian data in this article.
The rationale for the sampling in this study was to obtain a broad crosssection of larger organizations throughout Australia. We focused particularly on larger organizations (employing 50 or more) and our sample is skewed towards these organizations. (US readers should note that Australia's economy is a small-firm economy compared to the USA: 95 percent of Australia's enterprises employ less than 20 people, generating more than 43 percent of total private-sector employment (Fulop: 1992) .) This size parameter was chosen because of the primary focus on downsizing and delayering. Pilot studies and case studies indicated that 'delayering' had very little meaning for organizations employing less than 50 people. In relation to industry categories and the public and private sectors, there are no significant differences between the achieved sample and the larger-firm population. Further details of response rates are provided in the Appendix.
Analyses
No inferential statistics were used in this study, as we were, predominantly, concerned with a total population of larger firms. Given our focus on labourmarket flows, descriptive statistics were the main research tool. Second, we used cross-tabulations and bivariate correlations between downsizing and managerial downsizing variables. An analysis of correlation requires consideration of outliers that may result in cases biasing the calculations. A systematic elimination of cases from the calculation of correlations was undertaken based on identifying univariate outliers greater than 3.29 standard deviations (p > .001) from the mean change values for each change variable in each of the 14 samples. This resulted in the elimination of 0-10 cases in each of the calculations. In relation to size and industry, analyses of variance were conducted.
Results
The Volume of Managerial Positions
Did the 1990s, as a period of downsizing and organizational restructuring, slice through managerial ranks and leave a shattered corps behind? As we have seen, the rhetoric of Peters (1992) and Drucker (1989) certainly suggested no other outcome for the edge of the millennium. The extent of managerial and administrative positions in the late 1980s and 1990s can be discerned from two sources: the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Longitudinal Data Set (ALDS) compiled by the authors. The ABS provides census data interspersed with a 10 percent sample Labour Force Survey. The ABS labour force statistics, in parallel with the USA, show that the volume of management positions has been growing. 'The volume in Australia increased from nearly 500,000 in 1986 to more than 631,000 in 1995' (ABS 1996a) . 'This represents growth of twenty-seven percent in ten years and is a continuation of an upward trend that has been noted since 1970' (Marchant 1998: 123) . By 1998, the trend had levelled. Indeed, the ABS Labour Mobility Survey indicated 598,500 managers and administrators in employment (ABS 1998: 22) . This constituted a drop of 32,500 or 5 percent. This difference is not conclusive, because there are problems of differing survey methods and standard errors. So what did the ALDS data show?
The ALDS data from 1990-99 (see Table 2 ) shows that the managerial job slots in larger Australian firms declined across the decade. There was a drop of 30,000 between 1990 and 1994. The situation recovered somewhat, but had not got back to the 1990 level by 1999. This is contrary to expectations in terms of Gordon's thesis.
Therefore, any managerial job increases have occurred outside the population of larger firms, either in the public sector (remember this is not covered by ALDS) or in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) employing less than 100. A national survey of employees conducted in 1999 associated with the restructuring projects showed that governmental employees had been significantly more exposed to downsizing than any other industry during the 1990s (Dawkins and Littler 2001: 53-55) . At the aggregate level too, government administration is one of the few 'downsizing' industries between 1984 and 1997 (Dawkins et al. 1999: 22) . Thus, any growth of managers' jobs is more likely in smaller firms. This issue will be investigated more fully using the population of firms in the longitudinal data set.
So far, then, we have examined the number of job slots on the managerial peg board. The situation has been one of decline. Moreover, the picture has to be seen in the context of overall growth in the Australian labour forcegrowth of about 1. 
Administrative Intensity
As Gordon (1996: 46) himself points out, in the context of a growing labour force, looking at raw numbers does not tell us enough -it is the ratio of managers to employees that is more significant. Freeman and Hannan (1975) term this 'administrative intensity' and we will use that term here. One argument is that the ratio of managers to employees will decrease as delayering occurs and middle managers are treated as 'cooked geese'. We have already seen that the early ABS data indicated an increasing managerial density and later calculations suggest a continuing pattern of increase despite delayering (for example, Marchant 1998: 127). If we examine the population of larger firms, then the pattern is indicated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 is based on the aggregate data across the 10 years and on the summed firm-level average. There are some differences because the summed organizational means give equal weighting to both small and larger firms. Nevertheless, the two measures tap out across the graph space virtually identical trends. Figure 1 indicates that there has been a progressive decline in administrative intensity over the 10 years. This data fits with the preliminary landscape depicted by the raw numbers.
The span of control is another way of expressing the ratio of managers to employees. Following Freeman and Hannan (1975) , for administrative intensity we have used a divisor excluding managers. However, as managers supervise managers, for the span of control calculation we include managers in the divisor. The managerial span of control based on summed data showed a clear trend of increase from 11.38 in 1990 to 14.41 in 1999. Averaged across all firms the figures reach higher levels, up to 25.6 by the end of the decade. The advocates of flattened organization, such as Peters or Keuning and Opheij, would feel vindicated, but this does not confirm Gordon's thesis. There are significant differences between industries in relation to administrative intensity. Our examination of Australian industries for the first few years of the 1990s showed that wholesale and retail as well as finance had the largest proportions of managers (Littler et al. 1994 ). The small size or geographical dispersion of operations in the retail and wholesale trades, recreation, personal and other services, and finance, property and business services calls for the appointment of a large management cadre within any firm to perform the tasks of coordination at headquarters and, most crucially in terms of numbers, operational management at local level. The differences in the nature and functions of management may have effects on the potential for managerial downsizing.
Managerial Job Stability
In the USA, Cappelli (1999: 119) reports that the churning of the workforce has particularly affected middle managers. This is supported by the late 1990s US data, which shows that middle managers have been hit especially hard by job shedding in (Patterson 1999 Jacoby 1999) . Jacoby (1999: 126) , while emphasizing 'continuity amidst change', notes that 'The sharpest tenure decline occurred in managerial and professional-technical occupations.' Over the course of the 1990s, what has been the Australian experience of managerial job stability? The Australian Bureau of Statistics in its biennial labour-mobility surveys (ABS 1992 (ABS , 1994 (ABS , 1996b (ABS , 1998 (ABS , 2000 , based on household surveys, shows managers as having a relatively low mobility rate. For example, in 1997, managers and administrators were the most likely occupation to have stayed in their job for at least one year: 90 percent of the group (ABS 1998: 6).
If we examine the total net loss of managerial positions from organizations plus the total net gain of managerial positions for organizations, then these can be combined to create a general measure of managerial labour flows. This measure ('labour churn') combines voluntary and involuntary job changes. The flows run at approximately 25 percent per year, with some slippage over the last two years of the decade. This represents a significant level of churn -as a manager, I witness one in four of my colleagues losing or changing jobs or being restructured. Table 3 uses a different indicator: it assesses the mean number of managers cut or gained per year. This generates a numeric ratio of losses over gains, as set out in the last column of Table 3 . This ratio means that anything in excess of 1.0 represents a net loss. There are three years of overall net loss. The latter three years in the decadal sequence (1996-99) show limited overall gains.
In general, the large-firm data suggest a relatively high mobility rate for managers, only slackening in the last two years of the decade. However, the drivers of this process need to be elucidated. As has been noted, labour churn combines voluntary and involuntary job changes. The issue of involuntary redundancies is considered below. Are managers at risk?
Data on Managerial Redundancies
Seven years after the start of extensive restructuring in Australia, in 1997 the Australian Bureau of Statistics conducted the first national survey of retrenchment and redundancy (ABS 1997) . The data provided for the first time was illuminating. The ABS survey provides information on the characteristics of those people who had been made redundant in the three years up to June 1997 and identifies the occupations most vulnerable to retrenchment and those most able to be re-employed within a three-year maximum time span.
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In general, the data showed persons in occupations with low-to-medium skill levels were more likely to be retrenched than persons with higher skill levels. Labourers, with a rate of 21.6 percent, had the highest level of vulnerability and, in contrast, professionals, with a rate of a little less than 6 percent, had the lowest vulnerability. Some 57 percent of redundant persons were in the four lowest skilled occupations groups compared with 47 percent of all employees at May 1997. The figures show that managers and administrators had one of the lowest rates of vulnerability to being laid off -only professionals were more insulated. In general, managers appeared to be a low-risk group.
An alternative investigation into the social impact of downsizing is to examine the re-employability of individuals who have lost jobs. The ABS data shows that re-employability is skill based. At one extreme, managers and administrators have the highest rate of re-employability at more than 74 percent. In contrast, unskilled labourers have the lowest rate at 43.5 percent. This is a striking difference and indicates a traditional exposure to job insecurity and unemployment despite the concerns expressed about the downsizing of managers. In the USA, this conclusion has been echoed by Jacoby (1999) , and in the UK, by Burchell et al. (2002) .
Given that the ABS retrenchment and redundancy survey was the first national survey of its kind, we are not able to track changes over time from this data source. It provides us with a snapshot of the moment and it indicates the relative insulation of managers. The national data still leave us with a puzzle: managers and administrators are not at risk compared to many other occupational groups. The paradox of managerial downsizing persists and, indeed, intensifies. The ABS data seems to close the 'vulnerability' case, but a national survey of managers conducted as part of this broad restructuring project by Marchant in 1997 indicated some complexities to the case. In an analysis of more than 1,000 job histories, Marchant (1998; Marchant and Littler 1998) The above findings fit with the data from the USA, where the sharpest jobtenure declines occurred in managerial and professional-technical occupations during the 1990s (Diebold et al. 1997) . Nor were Australian managers treated differently to the rest of the workforce in relation to the crucial issue of advance notice of job loss. The ABS data showed that 22 percent of employees received less than one day's notice, while 24 percent of managers were in the same category (ABS 1997: 23; Marchant 1998: 317) .
In sum, the ABS national statistics are a static picture comparing managers with other groups, not probing the situation over time. Equally, the national statistics do not assess the direction of labour-market flows -managers may get re-employed, but as what? These two parameters crucially shape managers' experience on the labour market.
Managers as Targets?
If managerial redundancies and the vulnerability of managers are increasing, then it raises the issue of whether managers are the targets of downsizing. Is delayering the starting point of strategic change? We can approach this issue by examining our national survey data from 1995 and 1998. According to the national survey data, in Australia in 1995 the incidence of delayering (44 percent of organizations) was extensive. The 1998 Australian survey showed that the basic trend towards the flattening of organizational hierarchies had remained constant over the latter part of the 1990s (see Table 4 ). For both surveys managers were asked: 'Over the past two years, to what extent, if at all, has your organization engaged in delayering, that is, reducing the number of managerial levels in the hierarchy?' Similarly, they were asked: 'Over the past two years, to what extent, if at all, has your organization engaged in workforce reduction, that is, reducing the overall number of employees?' Answers to these two questions combined enabled us to classify organizations in terms of columns A-D in Table 4 .
It can be seen that delayering is an unusual go-it-alone strategy, but not unknown -about 10 percent of firms attempt to restructure by pursuing a delayering strategy. For these 10 percent of firms, managers are definitely a target of change. Within this scenario, middle managers are the predominant target, following along from the prescriptions of Peters (Littler et al. 2003) .
Delayering is not the same as managerial downsizing -this is one of the confusions in the literature. Wheatley (1992: 15) in the 1992 British Institute of Management (BIM) survey, faced with the evidence, confused the situation. The BIM survey showed that in 36 percent of cases fewer management levels meant fewer managers and in 16 percent of instances more levels was associated with more managers. But in 41 percent of firms, there was no lock step of movement. Indeed, in 14 percent of firms there was a situation of fewer management levels and more managers -this is 'the soft sandwich' process defined in an earlier section. Fortunately, we can use ALDS to examine the trends in managerial downsizing.
This question (managers as targets) can also be examined by looking at managerial downsizing within the longitudinal data set in relation to employee downsizing. The relationship between firms that downsize and those that undertake managerial downsizing is presented in Figure 2 . The figure summarises a cross-tabulation between general downsizing and managerial downsizing for each pair of consecutive years between 1990 and 1999 for all firms.
Several points are clear. First, the proportion of firms undertaking a process of managerial downsizing only is similar to the delayering only reported outcomes (range of 4.8 percent of total organizations to 11 percent; mean = 7.4 percent; see lower graph line in Figure 2) . The cross-sectional data and the longitudinal data are relatively compatible, given that in the surveys managers were asked about delayering 'over the past two years'.
Second, at initial examination, there is not a close association between downsizing and managerial downsizing: the trends are different. Up to 1994/5, it looked as though there was increasing convergence. However, from the mid1990s the processes diverged as organizational downsizing accelerated again. Managerial downsizing appears relatively flat (range of 12.1 percent of total (274) 28% (280) Sources: 1995 and 1998 national surveys (N = 609 and N = 999 organizations) Table 4 . Extent of Delayering, Australia 1995 and organizations to 18.5 percent; mean = 15.5 percent; see mid-graph line in Figure 2 ). However, there could be significant lag effects, such that the downsizing peak of 1991/92 generates a managerial peak in 1993/94. In sum, some targeting of managers took place during the 1990s and peaked during the mid-1990s. The cross-sectional data and the longitudinal data tend to corroborate each other. However, earlier phases of employee downsizing may have been the driving force.
Trajectories of Change: Continuous Downsizers
One test of the featherbedding hypothesis is to examine continuously downsizing organizations. If we consider the progress of continuous or serial downsizers, that is, those firms that downsized year after year during the period of the decade, then the issue arises of what happens to managers. The longitudinal data set allows us to track these processes across the decade for the first time. Figure 3 and the associated data allow us to examine the tracks of change over six-year time blocks. The data consist of continuous reporting of firms set out in five sequences, depending on the year the organization started downsizing. One caution needs to be borne in mind -the left wall of the data set is impenetrable to us, that is to say, we do not know if firms pre-1990 had downsized before, or not at all, or even upsized. No systematic data exists. From Figure 3 a number of striking trends are apparent. First, with one exception, the first year of downsizing indicates a featherbedding process, with the proportion of managers increasing to some degree. Second, the following year indicates a correction such that without exception all samples show a decline in managerial density. So far, the pattern does not neatly fit with Gordon's expected results (see Table 1 ). Moreover, with minor variations, this pattern is repeated for all samples varied by size and industry sector. 1 9 9 0 -9 1 1 9 9 1 -9 2 1 9 9 2 -9 3 1 9 9 3 -9 4 1 9 9 4 -9 5 1 9 9 5 -9 6 1 9 9 6 -9 7 1 9 9 7 -9 8 1 9 9 8 -9 9
Total Managerial DS >20%
Managerial DS only
Organizational DS >5% For the third and fourth years of downsizing the trends are mixed -some firms reach relative stability; others continue to displace managers. By the fifth year, there is no stability of managerial profiles. There is either a collapse of numbers and proportions or there is a managerial bloat with huge proportions of managers, up to nearly 18 percent at the end of the 1991 sequence. The numbers here are small, but for the 1991 starting sample and the 1994 starting sample there is evidence of a managerial swelling -a phenomenon that has not been identified before.
With the instances of a collapse of numbers, it may be that managers are being downsized to a fundamental core, without which the firm cannot function. This process is certainly associated with decline. Alternatively, it indicates a loyalty collapse, whereby managers leave for more secure positions in other firms (Littler et al. 2003) . The opposite phenomenon (managerial swelling) is also indicative of decline.
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Taking six-year slices from the population carries us into the territory of organizational decline. If we focus on three-year samples, we can sample a broader area of the population. Here we can generate eight sequences, depending on the year that the organization first reported downsizing. The succession of these sequences indicates something surprising. The first five sequences, except the 1990 start, show the up-down pattern for the managerial level of employment -this indicates the already observed featherbedding process followed by a correction. However, the last three sequences, starting with 1995, shows a down-stable or down-up pattern. This change in pattern is open to various interpretations, but case-study and cross-sectional data (Littler 1998) suggest that firms went through a learning cycle and became more active in cutting managers through the decade.
The tracking of firms across the decade shows that there is some short-term featherbedding. In these cases, Gordon was correct, but the longitudinal data show that the insulation does not persist -instability and managerial cuts soon cross the horizon of security. This diminution of security takes place If we examine the patterns of managerial job creation and destruction broken down in terms of size of the firm, then some interesting results appear. Size of firm is measured here by workforce numbers at the 1990 starting position. Table 5 shows the numerical loss and gain of managers for each of the four size bands plus the proportionate losses taking the initial number of managers as the benchmark. It is clear that the largest firms (500 employees or more) lost the most managers and over the decade gained proportionately the least. In contrast, the smaller firms gained the most managers (304 percent increase of the initial number for the more than 150 employees category). On the face of it, there has been, so to speak, a 'tipping' of managers from the larger organizations into the smaller enterprises. The labour flows are from larger to smaller. Managers are still part of the organizational labour market, but in smaller employment units. The smaller firm context implies changed career structures and reduced levels of job security. Managers who had been made redundant reported higher levels of current job insecurity compared to continuously employed managers (Marchant 1998: 335, Figure 7 .7). Jacoby (1999: 123) refers to this as 'risk-shifting', but argues that there are structural limits to the risk-shifting process in the larger economies.
However, the apparent labour flows hide the larger effects on individual managers. The 'decanting' process does not occur without some spillage. We know from the national survey of managers (Marchant 1998: labour flows in and out of the smallest firms. However, the size effect is apparent in the population of firms we can access. This pattern explains both the stable (or even increasing) number of managers in the national statistics and the simultaneous reported experiences of displacement and insecurity as indicated in the repeated survey data.
Conclusions: Pinning Down the Paradox
The arguments advanced above have relied on a wide range of data sets, many of which will be unfamiliar to European or US readers. Therefore, it is advisable to reduce the complexity to the reader by summarizing in tabular form, which we have done in Table 6 . What happened to managerial employment trends during the 1990s? We have seen that the theories of change are contradictory. In this light, we set out to assess Gordon's 'myth of managerial downsizing' thesis and interrogate its applicability to the Australian managerial labour market in the 1990s. Assessing continuity and change is never easy, but nevertheless, we have the depth and range of data resources to probe further than other efforts.
If we return to the four interpretations of the paradox of managerial downsizing outlined earlier, then we can see that 'pseudo-downsizing' does not hold up. It is true that some corporations announced downsizing to the stock market and did not follow through; it is true that some departments changed titles, reshuffled the organization chart, and did not restructure (Littler 1998; Lurie 1998; Jacoby 1999) . However, our 1998 survey data showed that between 1994 and 1998 a staggering 88 percent of firms had undertaken some form of restructuring. To repeat, whatever happened in the 1990s, it was not just 'organizational cosmetics' and false signalling to the capital markets.
What, then, was the key to the 1990s? The longitudinal data set showed a dramatic loss of managers by 1994, amounting to 20 percent of the starting base. Though recruitment improved, the volume of managers never climbed back to the starting point. The levels of job creation and destruction were very high through much of the 1990s -with rates of 25 percent or more of managerial jobs on the market. Thus, firms were, at a minimum, using a strategy of 'burn and churn'. Not until 1997 did the process of managerial losses slow. This is confirmed by the managerial downsizing trends.
Underlying the levels of churn and managerial job destruction was the widespread diffusion of the strategy of delayering. The 1995 and 1998 national survey data showed the widespread reality of delayering across a broad swathe of firms -44 percent in each period. According to case-study data, at organizations such as large Australian banks delayering happened. In some organizations, delayering did not involve managerial downsizingthis is what we have termed the 'soft sandwich' process. In other words, individuals changed and positions were restructured, but numbers remained similar. Many new specialist departments were set up and managers got squeezed out at the sides, to be slotted into the new departments (Littler and Maguire 2001) . However, at many other large firms there was a 'tipping out' of managers from large firms to smaller. It is this process, above all, that masks the crucial changes in the large-firm labour market that shaped managers' lives during the decade. At the aggregate level, apparent labour market continuity exists, while many managers experienced dramatic changes involving career disruption, loss of job security, and even loss of managerial status.
Examination of a comprehensive field of firms within one smaller economy enables us, for the first time, to verify what happened to managers over the decade of the 1990s. The predominant picture for the Australian context was one of dramatic changes in managerial labour markets. The 'myth of managerial downsizing' must be rejected. Is this conclusion generalizable? Much of the discussion and conceptualization about the changing and continuing role of managers has been shaped by the US debate and data. 4 Yet, as a core economy and the only economic superpower, the US experience may be distinctive and Gordon (1996: 42-48) himself argues that the US pattern is atypical. The detailed and comprehensive analysis of the experience of another economy demonstrates a more complex reality. Certainly much of the British data (for example, Worrall and Cooper 2001) suggests similar patterns of change to the Australian pattern of events.
Many HRM debates about changing contours fail to discuss labour markets adequately (for example, Sparrow and Marchington 1998 ). Yet, labour markets structure managers' behaviour in a fundamental way in relation to psychological contracts, flexibility, and commitment. Thus, the shifting shape of the managerial labour market during the 1990s has crucial importance. The 21st-century implications are for greater flows into and out of managerial ranks, with more people calling themselves 'managers' for periods, and continued insecurities and job pressures. a IBIS is a private-sector business information system with data on over 6,000 firms to which we had access. 1 Levinson (1990) gives least consideration to this explanation. In fact, the cost-structure argument is more complex. Thus service providers may still save labour costs because of cheaper labour and lower salary and benefit packages for managers. 2
The ABS household survey measured labour-market flows over the three years up to 30 June 1997. Therefore, the maximum period of unemployment was three years postredundancy. 3
There is not space in a short article to discuss and analyse this phenomenon. It involves two threads of change. The predominant thread is that of asset sales and extensive outsourcing associated with a (temporary) core of managers. 4
Though the US data are extensive and systematically researched, there are serious limits to available resources. For example, none of the US government agencies collect data on employment in different occupations (including managers) based on size of company (Levinson 1990: 238 
